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CHADWICK

TIME’S UP FOR ATTORNEY-CLIENT SEXUAL VIOLENCE
GILLIAN R. CHADWICK*
ABSTRACT
Lawyers have positioned themselves at the helm of litigation and policy
reform catalyzed by #MeToo. However, lawyers have catastrophically
failed to self-regulate with respect to sexual violence. When confronted
with fellow lawyers who have sexually abused and harassed their own
clients, the attorney discipline system has fallen short of its mission to
protect the public and maintain the integrity of the profession. Despite
a robust set of ethical rules that would support strong disciplinary
consequences for attorneys who have committed sexual misconduct
against their clients, a review of post-#MeToo cases reveals remarkable
leniency in the discipline of such attorneys. State disciplinary
authorities and courts have consistently prioritized the subjective
experience of the offending attorney to the near total exclusion of the
client-victim’s subjective experience. In justifying lenient sanctions for
egregious sexual misconduct, adjudicators have used a proportionality
analysis linked to regressive precedent, thus halting any potential
progress towards fairer outcomes. Adjudicators have devalued the
harm experienced by client-victims of sexual violence by their attorneys.
As a result, attorneys have been permitted to prey upon clients—
including particularly vulnerable, marginalized, and desperate
clients—with relative impunity. This Article argues for the need to take
bold action to address attorney-client sexual violence and assure the
public that attorney-client sexual exploitation is not tolerated within the
profession. Accordingly, the Article advocates for the long-overdue
universal adoption of the sexual conflict of interest rule and proposes
strict liability and presumptive disbarment for attorney-client sexual
contact and presumptive actual suspension for all other attorney-client
sexual harassment. The Article also proposes a survivor-centered model
of attorney discipline and argues that such a model would bring the
discipline system closer to achieving its widely accepted purposes of
protecting the public and maintaining the integrity of the profession.
© 2022 Gillian R. Chadwick
*Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Children & Family Law Center at
Washburn University School of Law. Thank you to Courtney Cross, Marsha Griggs, Rory
Bahadur, Timothy Casey, and participants of the 2021 Clinical Law Review Writer’s Workshop
for their thoughtful feedback at various stages of this project, to Creighton Miller for technical
assistance, and to Kayla Clark and Lauren Martin for research assistance.
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Finally, the Article makes the perhaps controversial proposal that the
legal profession should explore abuse prevention protocols to reduce
attorney-client sexual violence, particularly against minors. Given the
harm that lawyers have inflicted upon those we purport to help, the
profession must be open to new strategies to address and prevent
attorney-client sexual violence.
INTRODUCTION
Despite lawyers playing a central role in litigation and advocacy
catalyzed by #MeToo,1 the legal profession has yet to address its own
sexual violence problem.2 This Article addresses the attorney discipline
system’s ongoing failure to adequately address sexual violence
committed by lawyers against clients. While #MeToo generated an
explosion in legal scholarship,3 only a small portion of that scholarship

1

Darlene Ricker, #metoo Movement Spurs National Legal Response Lawyers Create Defense
Networks to Assist Victims, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 1, 2018, 2:40 AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/lawyer_defense_networks_metoo_victims
(describing lawyers playing central roles in emerging #MeToo movement).
2
This Article will use the term sexual violence to encompass both sexual harassment and sexual
abuse as defined infra notes 6 and 7.
3 See, e.g., Jamillah Bowman Williams, Maximizing #MeToo: Intersectionality & the
Movement, 62 B.C. L. REV. 1797, 1810 (2021) (arguing that legal reforms arising from the Me
Too movement have failed women of color); Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 833-34 (2019)
(arguing private actors are recasting the public sphere as private space in furtherance of their
own norms and values); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Me, Too and #MeToo: Women in Congress
and the Boardroom, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1079, 1088, 1093 (2019) (examining potential
effects of #MeToo on the gender composition of public company boards in relation to the
composition of legislative bodies); Angela Onwuachi-Willig, What About #UsToo?: The
Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo Movement, 128 YALE L.J.F. 105, 111, 113-14 (2018) (arguing
that racial biases reflected in the #MeToo movement illustrate the need for an objective standard
in sexual harassment law centered on intersectional and multidimensional identities of
complainants); Nora Stewart, The Light We Shine into the Grey: A Restorative #MeToo Solution
and an Acknowledgment of Those #MeToo Leaves in the Dark, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1693, 1712,
1715 (2019) (proposing restorative justice response, based on indigenous jurisprudence, as a
legal solution to certain #MeToo misconduct); Lesley Wexler et al., #MeToo, Time’s Up, and
Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 71, 91-92, 110 (2019) (examining complexities of
restorative justice and insights of transitional justice for workplace sexual misconduct); Caitlin
Beller Mininger, A Crossroads in Time: The Implications of Intersectionality and #MeToo for
Sexual Harassment Law, 12 DREXEL L. REV. 651, 685-88 (2020) (applying an intersectional,
critical race feminist approach to contextualize sexual harassment law and culture); Elizabeth
C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229, 298 (2018)
(discussing legal and practical repercussions of #MeToo on employer practices); Daniel
Maggen, “When You’re A Star”: The Unnamed Wrong of Sexual Degradation, 109 GEO. L.J.
581, 634-35 (2021) (arguing the need for #MeToo to shed light on the distinct features of sexual
degradation).
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has focused on the legal profession itself.4 Even less has centered on the
topic of lawyer sexual misconduct towards clients.5 While intraprofessional sexual harassment6 and abuse7 of lawyers is an important
issue, this Article will focus on sexual harassment and abuse by lawyers
against their clients.
The power that lawyers have over their clients is profound. This
is particularly true in pro bono or low fee cases and in criminal and
family law contexts.8 The consequences of losing one’s liberty, custody
of children, and even parental rights create incredibly high stakes for
clients in these practice areas. Criminal and family lawyers often work
in solo or small firm practice.9 This combination of distressed clients
4 See, e.g., Katherine Yon Ebright, Taking #MeToo Seriously in the Legal Profession, 32 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 57, 75 (2019) (arguing that #MeToo movement has yet to reach the legal
profession); Wendy N. Hess, Addressing Sexual Harassment in the Legal Profession: The
Opportunity to Use Model Rule 8.4(g) to Protect Women from Harassment, 96 U. DET. MERCY
L. REV. 579, 583 (2019) (“This Article explores options available to legal professionals in order
to become more aware of and address sexual harassment within the profession.”); Ashley
Badesch, Lady Justice: The Ethical Considerations and Impacts of Gender-Bias and Sexual
Harassment in the Legal Profession on Equal Access to Justice for Women, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 497, 499 (2018) (analyzing the “opportunities and limitations of Model Rule 8.4(g) in
in addressing gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment within the legal profession”);
Leah M. Litman & Deeva Shah, On Sexual Harassment in the Judiciary, 115 NW. U. L. REV.
599 (2020) (examining sexual harassment in the legal industry, particularly federal courts).
5 See Ebright, supra note 4, at 68-69 (analyzing several discipline cases involving attorneys
who sexually abused or harassed clients); Hess, supra note 4, at 590-93 (tying lawyer sexual
harassment of clients into a broader analysis of attorney sexual misconduct); Badesch, supra
note 4, at 505-06 (discussing lawyer sexual harassment of clients among other analyses).
6 This Article will use “sexual harassment” to mean unwelcome sexual comments or behaviors
directed towards a person that make that person uncomfortable. These behaviors may or may
not violate criminal laws including those prohibiting stalking, voyeurism, revenge pornography,
and a variety of other crimes. Similarly, such behaviors may or may not meet the definition of
harassment as used in an employment law context.
7 This Article will use “sexual abuse” to mean unwanted sexual touching or attempted sexual
touching, including sexual contact or acts obtained through coercion. These behaviors may or
may not violate criminal laws, but when they do, exact elements and degrees of such offenses
vary greatly.
8 See Phillip R. Bower & Tanya E. Stern, Conflict of Interest?: The Absolute Ban on LawyerClient Sexual Relationships is Not Absolutely Necessary, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535, 543-44
(2003) (discussing the high risk of client exploitation in divorce/family, probate, and pro-bono
matters, and arguing for a ban on sexual relationships between pro bono attorneys and clients).
9 The West Legal Directory: Criminal, available through Westlaw, “[p]rofiles . . . law firms
and . . . attorneys who practice criminal law in any of the 50 states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, and Canada.” Thomson Reuters, West Legal Directory: Criminal Scope Information,
WESTLAW EDGE, https://next.westlaw.com (choose “Content types”; then, under “Specialty
areas,” choose “Directories”; then select “West Legal Directory” under “West Directories”; then
choose the “Practice Area” labeled “Criminal”; then click on the “Scope icon,” represented by
a circle containing the letter “i”). The West Legal Directory: Family contains equivalent
information for those practicing family law. Thomson Reuters, West Legal Directory: Family
Scope Information, WESTLAW EDGE, https://next.westlaw.com (choose “Content types”; then,
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and isolated office settings makes clients in these environments
especially vulnerable. Although many attorneys, particularly criminal
and family law attorneys, are undoubtedly drawn to that work by the
highest ideals of service and justice, a review of recent attorney
discipline cases reveals that many attorneys take advantage of their
power and their clients’ vulnerability to commit sexual violence.10
While its long-term implications are up for debate, #MeToo
drew attention to the issue of sexual violence and created pressure
towards accountability and justice for sexual violence.11 The legal
profession’s accountability mechanism for professional misconduct of
all kinds, including sexual misconduct, is the attorney discipline
system.12 Unfortunately, recent cases across the country show the
attorney discipline system continues to be quite tolerant of lawyers who
sexually abuse and harass their clients.13 Indeed, it is alarming what
lawyers have done to their clients without losing the privilege to practice
law.14 This Article will address this problem in four parts.
Part I will discuss several examples of permissive disciplinary
results in attorney-client sexual misconduct cases decided since 2018.15
These cases demonstrate the legal profession’s unwillingness to hold
our own accountable to basic standards of decency and professionalism
under “Specialty areas,” choose “Directories”; then select “West Legal Directory” under “West
Directories”; then choose the “Practice Area” labeled Family then click on the “Scope icon,”
represented by a circle containing the letter “i”).
Searching via the advanced search form in West Legal Directory: Criminal for “USA” as a “Key
Search Term” (search chosen to retrieve as many lawyers as possible) retrieves more than
10,000 records. Of these, 9,836 list “Law Firm” as their profile type. Many of the law firm
entries are inactive or stub records with little information, but among the 2,281 records for which
firm size data is available, 658 (29%) are for solo practitioners. West Legal Directory: Criminal,
WESTLAW EDGE, https://next.westlaw.com (last visited May 26, 2022). The same search on West
Legal Directory: Family also retrieves more than 10,000 records, 9,847 of which are for law
firms. 2,358 records provide firm size data, and that data shows 556 entries (24%) for solos.
West Legal Directory: Family, WESTLAW EDGE, https://next.westlaw.com (last visited May 26,
2022).
These figures may well undercount the actual percentage of solo practitioners. “[D]irectories
generally include only the information that the subjects provide,” Mary Whisner, The 4-1-1 on
Lawyer Directories, 106 L. LIBR. J. 257, 261 (2014), and some evidence suggests the West Legal
Directory may not be as comprehensive as other major lawyer directories. See id. at 262. If solo
practitioners enjoy less administrative support than firm attorneys, which seems intuitively
reasonable, they may be less likely to contribute information to the directory.
10 See infra Part I.
11 See infra Part II.
12 See generally Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis
of Process and Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 209 (2011) (examining attorney discipline systems
on a state-by-state basis).
13 See infra Part I.
14 See infra Part I.
15 See infra Part I.
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when it comes to sexual violence against clients.16 Through the attorney
discipline system, the legal profession fails to reconcile the widespread
harm that members of the profession do in the form of sexual abuse and
harassment of clients. Indeed, case after case shows that lawyers have
been allowed to sexually prey upon particularly vulnerable clients, even
children, and continue practicing law after a brief—if any—
suspension.17
Part II begins with a brief discussion of the Me Too movement
and #MeToo,18 noting that #MeToo drove litigation and legal reform
efforts in which lawyers played critical roles.19 This discussion is
juxtaposed with an exploration of the profound harm that attorney-client
sexual violence does to client-victims, the public, and the legal
profession. Sexually predatory lawyers not only harm and traumatize
their victims, but also diminish the credibility and integrity of the
profession as a whole. The profession and the public are further harmed
when the purportedly self-regulating attorney discipline system fails to
hold those abusive attorneys accountable.
Part III applies existing rules of professional conduct to
attorney-client sexual violence, demonstrating that current attorney
ethics rules and guidelines have the capacity to address this problem,
and suggests several reasons why that capacity is being severely
underutilized in many instances.20 Those reasons include protectionism,
minimization of harm, regressive precedent, and consent confusion.
This Article rejects the notion that clients are free to consent to sex
within the attorney-client relationship. Due to the power imbalance
inherent in the attorney-client relationship, any sexual contact between
attorney and client is inherently unequal. When clients face the
possibility of losing their freedom or children, this power imbalance is
compounded. Clients may be particularly vulnerable due to indigency
and social marginalization.21 In the context of such a power imbalance,
sexual contact is inherently exploitative.
16

See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
18 The distinction between the Me Too movement and #MeToo is delineated in Part II.A.
19 See infra Part II.
20 See infra Part III.
21 Sexual abusers choose victims who are particularly vulnerable because they want a victim
who is less likely to report the abuse and less likely to be believed if he or she does report.
Therefore, those who are poor, Black, Indigenous, people of color, immigrants, queer, and other
marginalized identities are more vulnerable to this pattern of abuse by lawyers who purport to
help them. See Heather Littleton & David DiLillo, Introduction, Global Perspectives on Sexual
Violence: Understanding the Experiences of Marginalized Populations and Elucidating the
Role of Sociocultural Factors in Sexual Violence, 11 PSYCH. VIOLENCE 429, 429 (2021) (“[R]isk
17
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Finally, Part IV suggests a number of reforms to bring clarity,
accountability, and prevention to attorney-client sexual misconduct.
Among the reforms this Article proposes is a universal ban on attorney
client sexual contact.22 Although not a panacea, a universal ban would
improve clarity and administrability of existing professional norms.
Additional reforms would drive more serious consequences for
attorneys who sexually victimize their clients. Specifically, the Article
proposes a strict liability approach to sexual conflict of interest,
presumptive disbarment for attorney-client sexual contact, and
presumptive actual suspension for other forms of sexual harassment
against clients.
I.

FAILURE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

In a profession that purports to value justice and fairness, too
many attorneys have sexually abused and harassed their clients with
relative impunity and returned to the profession with little to no
for sexual violence is not evenly distributed. Although some high-risk groups have been studied
consistently (e.g., women), other vulnerable populations have received little attention. In
particular, those with marginalized and stigmatized identities, including LGBTQ+ individuals
and racial/ethnic minority individuals experience elevated rates of sexual violence but have
rarely been the focus of research to understand their experiences.”) (citations omitted).
22 Twelve states have no rule of professional responsibility banning attorney-client sexual
contact. GA RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.8; LA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.8; MD. ATT’YS’
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 19-301 cmt. 12, r. 19-308.4 cmt. 3; MASS. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT,
r. 1.8; MICH. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.8 cmt. Sexual Relations with Clients; MISS. RULES OF
PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.8; N.J. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.8; R.I. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.8;
S.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.8; TENN. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.8; TEX. DISCIPLINARY
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.8; VA. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.8. A number of scholars have
argued that so-called consensual sex between attorney and client should be permitted by ethics
rules, or that there are circumstances under which such behavior could be equitable and therefore
ethically permissible. See, e.g., Bower & Stern, supra note 8, at 541-44 (arguing that Model
Rule 1.8(j) is overinclusive); Linda Fitts Mischler, Reconciling Rapture, Representation, and
Responsibility: An Argument Against Per Se Bans on Attorney-Client Sex, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 209 (1996) (criticizing the ethical ban on attorney-client sex); Craig D. Feiser, Strange
Bedfellows: The Effectiveness of Per Se Bans on Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 33 J. LEGAL
PRO. 53, 54-55 (2008) (“Some claim that while preventing attorney exploitations and abuses of
the legal relationship are laudable goals, any per se ban on sexual relationships necessarily
sweeps too broadly into personal relationships . . .”). But see, e.g., Margit Livingston, When
Libido Subverts Credo: Regulation of Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 5
(1993) (reviewing state rules and cases and recommending a per se ban); Anthony E. Davis &
Judith Grimaldi, Sexual Confusion: Attorney-Client Sex and the Need for a Clear Ethical Rule,
7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 57, 58 (1993) (arguing the need for a specific ethical
rule banning attorney-client sex); Casey W. Baker, J.D., Attorney-Client Sexual Relationships
in the #MeToo Era: Understanding Current State Approaches and Working Towards a Better
Rule, 49 SW. L. REV. 243 (2020) (analyzing Model Rule 1.8(j) and different state approaches to
addressing attorney-client sexual relations, and proposing a new model rule that leans more
towards entirely and expressly banning such relations.).
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additional oversight, limitations, or safeguards against future abuse.23
This Part will highlight several attorney discipline cases that
demonstrate the scope and significance of the legal profession’s failure
to hold attorneys who sexually harass and abuse their clients
accountable. Although there is much to learn from older cases, the focus
of this Article is the period since #MeToo, which went viral online in
2017.24 Therefore, the cases discussed below are relatively recent. I
bring these particular cases to the reader’s attention as examples of
abhorrent attorney misconduct that garnered tepid disciplinary
consequences. Given the low reporting rates for sex crimes,25 it is likely
safe to assume these cases represent only a fraction of the abuse that
actually occurs. As disappointing as these cases are, it is important to
also keep in mind that the vast majority of abusers like these are likely
never caught and will continue to abuse.26 Proof problems and
unwarranted skepticism built on rape myths27 likely further diminish the
number of cases that reach discipline litigation.28 The following cases
should be taken as exemplars of a problem, the scope of which is still
unknown, but likely larger than most attorneys would want to admit.
23

Compare Mischler, supra note 22, at 214-15 (stating that as of 1996 the number of reported
attorney sexual misconduct claims to be relatively low and overstated in media and academia),
with infra note 19, at 446, 449 (discussing how rape and other forms of sexual misconduct are
underreported). And see Baker, supra note 22, at 250 (overviewing the Ethics 2000
Commission’s concern about attorney-client sexual misconduct in light of an “excessive number
of complaints beginning in 1998).
24 For examples of the lessons of the #MeToo movement which this Article will address vis-àvis the legal profession, see generally Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825 (2019)
(discussing private regulation of sex and sexuality where the state has failed); and Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo Movement, 128
YALE J.L.F. 105 (2018) (noting the importance of race and intersectionality in discussions about
the #MeToo movement).
25 See Karen G. Weiss, Neutralizing Sexual Victimization: A Typology of Victims’ NonReporting Accounts, 15 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 445, 446, 449 (2011) (noting a low
reporting rate for rape); Bonnie S. Fisher et al., Reporting Sexual Victimization to the Police and
Others: Results from a National-Level Study of College Women, 30 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 6, 7,
9, 31 (2003) (documenting low reporting rate for rape among college women).
26 Victoria Brown et al. eds., Rape & Sexual Assault, 21 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 367, 375-76
(2020).
27 Researchers have defined rape myths as “attitudes and beliefs that are generally false, but are
widely and persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male sexual aggression against
women.” Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Rape Myths: In Review, 18 PSYCH.
WOMEN Q. 133, 134 (1994). Examples of rape myths include, survivors are responsible for their
rapes, women desire to be raped, and rape reports are often false. Katie M. Edwards et al., Rape
Myths: History, Individual and Institutional-Level Presence, and Implications for Change, 65
SEX ROLES 761, 762-67 (2011).
28 Rape is underreported, and false reports of rape are rare. See generally Joanne Belknap, Rape:
Too Hard to Report and Too Easy to Discredit Victims, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1335
(2010) (contrasting high rates of unreported rape and low rates of false reporting).

CHADWICK

TIME’S UP

2022]

83

The cases below have one important thing in common: there is
little or no dispute about the facts of the conduct that gave rise to the
ethics charges.29 These are generally cases in which either the
respondent accepts the factual allegations, or the victim has recordings
of the incidents. Despite having some of the strongest evidence that can
be imagined in a sexual abuse or sexual harassment claim, these cases
result in relatively minor disciplinary consequences. Another common
feature of these cases is the particular vulnerability of the client-victims
due to their financial circumstances, the nature of their legal case,
gender, and other factors. Many of the cases below arise from domestic
and criminal cases in which client-victims are particularly desperate.
This fact highlights the severity of the attorneys’ misconduct and the
profundity of the power differential at play in these cases.
A. Sexual Abuse
Below is a discussion of cases that involve attorneys who
sexually abused their clients by subjecting them to unwanted sexual
contact, such as sexual assault by coercion.30 Although the attorneys in
these cases also subjected their clients to various forms of sexual
harassment, these sexual abuse cases are separated from those that
involve solely non-touching harassment, which are discussed in subpart
B.
i.

Stout

In a 2019 Oklahoma discipline case, attorney Richard E. Stout
was charged with sexual misconduct against three clients in three
separate matters in 2016 and 2017.31 Stout’s misconduct included
sexually harassing communications, “unwanted sexual advances,” and

29

See infra Sections I.A & I.B.
This Article uses the phrase “sexual assault by coercion” in an effort to be as precise as
possible. While cultural understandings of rape generally encompass all sex without freely given
consent, there is no universally accepted legal definition of consent. Aya Gruber, Consent
Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 423 (2016) (noting that the meaning of consent is widely
debated); see also Kari Hong, A New Mens Rea for Rape: More Convictions and Less
Punishment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 259, 261 (2018) (arguing the legal definition of rape by nonconsent fails to capture many forms of unwanted sex). State criminal laws vary widely, and in
some states, rape still requires an element of physical force, threat of bodily harm, incapacity,
or minor victim. Infra note 192.
31 Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Stout, 451 P.3d 155, 156-57 (Okla. 2019).
30
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apparently coerced sexual intercourse.32 Stout was found to have
violated the rules of professional conduct and sanctioned with three
months suspension with several limiting conditions upon his return to
practice.33
The case against Stout was separated into three counts involving
three different clients. The first count was that Stout “made ‘unwanted
sexual advances’” and “sent ‘sexually suggestive emails’” to his client
C.B., a woman whom Stout represented in seeking guardianship of her
minor nephew.34 Stout also asked C.B. for “sexually suggestive
photographs” and asked her to help him hide his inappropriate
comments by deleting them.35 C.B. “testified that she felt uncomfortable
with [Stout’s] continued representation,” terminated his representation
of her, and hired a new attorney.36 Stout admitted to the ethics trial panel
“that he sent sexually suggestive comments to C.B. by text message and
social media, and that these actions were improper and created harm to
his client.”37
The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that Stout “admitted to his
improper behavior and expressed deep remorse over the effect of his
actions on C.B.” and participated in a three-day inpatient sex addiction
treatment program.38 The court also focused on the fact that Stout
“voluntarily” contacted the state lawyer’s assistance program,
downplaying that he did so only after he was served notice of the ethics
complaint.39 The court seemed to value the subjective experience of
attorney Stout far more than the client he abused.
The second count against Stout was that he “sent sexually
suggestive text messages” to client C.R. and instructed her to delete the
messages after reading them.40 Stout represented C.R. in a divorce
matter.41 “Because of the sexual overtones in the communications, C.R.
did not feel like Mr. Stout was 100% focused on representing her in her
divorce matter.”42 C.R. did not terminate Stout’s representation of her,
32 Id. at 156-57. The facts as described in the case do not allow for a more specific
characterization than this. There are myriad circumstances under which coerced sexual
intercourse would amount to sexual assault, which may have been a more accurate way for the
trial board and the court to describe this conduct.
33 Id. at 160.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 156-57.
39 Id. at 156.
40 Id. at 157.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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despite him making her feel uncomfortable, because she did not want to
delay her divorce by switching lawyers.43 She did, however, take steps
to limit contact with him, such as handling some aspects of the case pro
se.44 Stout admitted to his actions and, the court noted, “took full
responsibility for his actions and said that at the time he engaged in this
behavior his thinking was distorted from his sexual addiction.”45 The
court did not seem troubled or even puzzled by Stout supposedly taking
full responsibility while also blaming his actions on a sex addiction.46
The third count against Stout was that he coerced client L.B. into
sexual intercourse. L.B. retained Stout to represent her in defending
against a criminal charge against her.47 Stout met L.B. in her home,
ostensibly because she had no way of getting to his office. According to
the court, “L.B. did not have money at the time to pay [Stout’s $7,500
retainer], and she wound up having sex with Mr. Stout that evening
‘because [she] was in a desperate situation.’”48 Stout told the ethics
board that he may have given L.B. a reduced fee in exchange for sex.49
Stout’s sexual abuse of L.B. took place under highly coercive
circumstances. The abuse occurred in L.B.’s home, L.B. was charged
with a crime for which she needed Stout’s help, and L.B. acquiesced to
intercourse out of “desperate[ion].” However, the court seemed to take
for granted that the intercourse was consensual and made no mention of
coercion in its analysis or discussion.50 Instead, the court focused
heavily on the fact that Stout took responsibility for his actions and,
when questioned, disclosed his misconduct with L.B. whom he stated
would not have come forward to report him on her own.51
Ultimately, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in its de novo review,
agreed with the trial panel that Stout committed misconduct warranting
suspension of three months.52 The court also adopted the trial panel’s
set of conditions upon Stout’s return to practice. Specifically, “(1) Mr.
Stout shall not accept female clients and will not meet alone with a
female at any time associated with his practice of law; (2) he will remain
in treatment as recommended by his counselor; (3) he will remain in
contact with Lawyers Helping Lawyers; and (4) he will maintain site
43

Id.
Id.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 158-60.
47 Id. at 157.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 159-60.
44
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blocking protection on his electronic devices.”53 These conditions
originated with Stout at the trial panel level, where he requested to be
sanctioned only with censure and these conditions.54
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that “the principal
objectives of a disciplinary proceeding are to protect the public and
purify the Bar, not to punish the lawyer,”55 and reviewed two recent
discipline cases with similar facts, both of which resulted in six-month
suspensions.56 Consistent expression of remorse seemed to be the
distinguishing factor between Stout’s case and another case in which the
attorney did not engage in intercourse with his client but also apparently
failed to express sufficient, consistent remorse.57 The court’s analysis
focused heavily on mitigation, downplaying aggravating factors such as
consciousness of guilt through repeated efforts to hide the sexually
harassing communications.58 The court seemed to weigh heavily Stout’s
claim that sex addiction caused him to harm his clients, even though
Stout did not seek help for his alleged addiction until he was facing
disciplinary consequences.59
ii.

Sarver

In the 2018 Ohio case Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver,60 attorney
Jason Allan Sarver coerced an indigent criminal defendant client into
having sexual contact with him.61 The board disciplined Sarver with six
months of actual suspension—a two-year suspension with eighteen
months stayed on multiple conditions.62 Although the Ohio Supreme
Court took a tougher approach than the ethics board and critiqued much
of the board’s permissive and victim-blaming analysis, the court

53

Id. at 160.
Id. at 159.
55 Id. (citing Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Givens, 343 P.3d 214 (Okla. 2015)).
56 The court referred to Oklahoma Bar Association v. Smalley, 432 P.3d 1048 (Okla. 2018), in
which Mr. Smalley was given a six-month suspension for sexual misconduct against two
separate clients, specifically for having sex with one client three separate times and for engaging
in lascivious communication with another client. The court also referred to Oklahoma Bar
Association v. Hixson, 397 P.3d 483 (Okla. 2017), in which Mr. Hixson was given a six-month
suspension for sexual misconduct against a client, namely sending eighty-three pages of sexual
text messages to his vulnerable, twenty-five-year-old client with a newborn baby.
57 Stout, 451 P.3d at 159-60 (citing Hixson, 397 P.3d 483).
58 Id. at 156-57, 160.
59
Id.
60 Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 119 N.E.3d 405 (Ohio 2018).
61 Id. at 408.
62 Id.
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ultimately accepted the board’s sentence, which imposed a mere six
months of actual suspension.63
Sarver met J.B. when he represented her boyfriend in 2012.64 In
September of 2015, J.B. reached out to Sarver because she believed she
might be facing a felony charge.65 The next day, Sarver and J.B. met to
discuss the case over drinks and “had sex” in Sarver’s car in the parking
lot.66 Sarver was then appointed to represent J.B. in that felony case.67
Sarver and J.B. “had sex” seven more times during his legal
representation. J.B. told investigators that Sarver had insinuated that he
would help her in exchange for “sexual favors.”68 She stated that she
had felt unable to say no to his proposal—she felt “kind of forced into
it” because she was facing seven felonies.69 Sarver also lied to a judge
by denying rumors that he was in a sexual relationship with J.B.70
Unlike many other abusive attorneys, Sarver was actually
charged with a sex crime for his actions, in addition to professional
discipline. Specifically, he faced two counts of coercive sexual conduct
against J.B.71 Those charges were later dismissed when Sarver pled
guilty to three misdemeanor counts of trespassing and one count of
obstructing official government business.72 The trespassing charge
arose from his authorized use of a neighbor’s hot tub, and the
obstruction charge was for advising J.B. to turn off her GPS to avoid
arrest.73
J.B. was placed in the position of being approached by detectives
and promised a reduced sentence if she would cooperate with an
investigation against her own attorney for his misconduct in the form of
coercing her into sex. 74 The board said that was a benefit to her because
she got a better plea deal. The board seemed concerned with the
consequence to Sarver, rather than the client-victim, reasoning:
63

Id. at 411-13.
Id. at 407.
65 Id. at 407-08.
66 Id. It is difficult to accurately summarize the facts because they are filtered through several
retellings. It is clear that intercourse occurred, and this author’s view is that any such intercourse
is abusive per se, regardless of whether it amounts to a sex crime under any particular state law.
In this case, criminal sex offense charges were filed against the attorney, but those charges were
reduced as part of a plea.
67 Id. at 408.
68 Id. at 407-08.
69 Id. at 408.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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(1) not only was there no harm to the client but the client
leveraged her relationship with [Sarver] to get a better
plea deal by agreeing to testify against him; (2) he
received a very public reprimand of sorts from the local
media because his arrest and indictment, while he was a
candidate for prosecutor, were front-page news; (3) he
was over-indicted with 14 felonies and four
misdemeanors including bribery and sexual battery
charges; (4) he was arrested twice and spent two nights
in jail; [and (5)] he was forced to withdraw his candidacy
for county prosecutor.75
The Ohio Supreme Court rightfully criticized this reasoning and
pointed out that Sarver’s conduct was abusive, coercive, unethical, and
occurred within a significant power hierarchy.76 The court noted that
Sarver’s behavior violated several Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct,
including 1.8(j), which bars attorneys from engaging in sexual contact
with clients outside of a preexisting consensual relationship.77 The court
correctly pointed out that comments and caselaw on rule 1.8(j) make
clear that a client’s apparent consent is not a defense to a violation of
that rule, noting that: “Reported cases are filled with clients who have
said that they submitted to their attorney’s sexual advances out of fear
that refusing to submit would affect the quality of their representation
at a time of vulnerability and dependence on the attorney.”78
The court also took issue with the board’s failure to hear
testimony from J.B. and ignoring several facts that pointed to her
subjective experience of the sexual contact with her attorney as coerced
or nonconsensual:
[A]lthough J.B. told detectives that she believed Sarver
was helping her in exchange for sexual favors and that
she had submitted to his sexual advances because of her
legal jeopardy—and notwithstanding relator’s statement
at the hearing that J.B. still contended that the sexual
75

Id. at 409.
Id. at 411-12.
77 Id. at 409.
78 Id. at 412 (citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Detweiler, 989 N.E.2d 41, 45 (Ohio 2013);
Disciplinary Counsel v. Moore, 804 N.E.2d 423, 426 (Ohio 2004); Akron Bar Ass’n v.
Williams, 819 N.E.2d 677, 679 (Ohio 2004); In re Vogel, 482 S.W.3d 520, 525 (Tenn. 2016);
Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moothart, 860 N.W.2d 598, 617 (Iowa 2015); In re
Berg, 955 P.2d 1240, 1257 (Kan. 1998); In re Rinella, 677 N.E.2d 909, 915 (Ill. 1997)).
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activity with Sarver was not consensual—the board
never heard directly from her before making conclusions
about the nature of her relationship with Sarver.79
In critiquing the board’s characterization of Sarver’s misconduct as a
consensual sexual relationship, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the
discipline board “essentially blamed the victim, J.B., for the negative
consequences that Sarver experienced,” even though Sarver himself had
made the decision to prey upon his indigent and desperate client.80
Finally, the court rejected the board’s conclusion that J.B. in fact
benefitted from Sarver’s abuse by “leverag[ing] her relationship with
[Sarver] to get a better plea deal.”81
The court strongly condemned Sarver’s despicable behavior and
rejected the board’s problematic rationale.82 However, despite its more
enlightened analysis, the court ultimately imposed just six months actual
suspension.83 Even a court that seemed to understand the issues of
power and coercion at play in this case and highlighted the resounding
absence of the victim’s voice in the proceedings, was unable to bring
itself to impose meaningful discipline.
Justice Fischer, joined by Justice O’Connor and Justice
DeGenaro, filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, reasoning that a six-month suspension was insufficient.84 Fischer’s
opinion noted that the board was unduly dismissive of the harm
experienced by the victim. The dissent also highlighted that Sarver
deceived the court multiple times during the course of his misconduct.85
Yet, even after strongly reasoning that Sarver’s abusive conduct harmed
his client and posed a danger to the public, Fischer then stated that an
appropriate sanction would be only one year of actual suspension.86
Despite much analysis, the final consequence for Sarver was relatively
minor (an actual suspension of six months) given the harm he inflicted
on J.B. and the havoc he inflicted on the administration of justice and
the integrity of the legal profession.87
Interestingly, Sarver was finally disbarred in 2020 after another
discipline case was filed against him—not for sexually exploiting a
79

Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 411-13.
83 Id. at 413.
84
Id. at 413-14 (Fischer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85 Id. at 415.
86 Id.
87 Id.
80
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client, but for practicing law without an active license.88 Thus, the
discipline board and Ohio Supreme Court demonstrated that the direct
consequences for disobedience against their own regulatory power are
far worse than the direct consequences for sexually exploiting and
harming vulnerable clients. In finding that disbarment was an
appropriate sanction, the court noted that disbarment is the presumptive
consequence for practicing under suspension.89 This Article
recommends a similar presumption for attorneys who exploit their
clients for sex.90
B. Sexual Harassment and Grooming
This subsection includes a discussion of discipline cases against
attorneys who subjected their clients to sexual harassment or grooming
comments and behaviors that do not involve sexual touching or
intercourse.
i.

Bledsoe

In the 2018 South Carolina case, Matter of Bledsoe, attorney
John W. Bledsoe coerced a client, who had recently lost custody of her
child, into showing him her breasts.91 For this—and for making a costly
drafting error in a separate case and delaying correction of that
mistake—Bledsoe entered into a discipline agreement and was given
public reprimand, as well as being mandated to complete an ethics and
practice course.92 The South Carolina Supreme Court issued a short
opinion that accepted the discipline agreement and concluded with a
statement that “respondent’s misconduct warrants a public
reprimand.”93
The court’s decision was less than 650 words and did not disturb
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel’s agreement with Bledsoe. The court
briefly discussed the two separate incidents of misconduct: first the
drafting mistake, then the sexual harassment and coercive voyeurism.94
The opinion contained highly limited information about the subjective
experience or life circumstances of the client-victim of what the court

88

Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 170 N.E.3d 799, 800-01 (Ohio 2020).
Id. at 805.
90 Infra Section IV.B.ii.
91 Matter of Bledsoe, 811 S.E.2d 775, 776 (S.C. 2018).
92 Id. at 777.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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calls “Matter B,” sexual harassment and coercive voyeurism. The
court’s summary of the facts was as follows:
At some point during his representation of Client B [who
had recently lost custody of her child], respondent
expressed to Client B that he was interested in a sexual
relationship with her. Respondent asked Client B to
show him her breasts. Client B showed respondent her
breasts, but felt ashamed and humiliated. Respondent
and Client B did not engage in a sexual relationship.95
This characterization of Bledsoe’s harassment as expression of
interest in a “sexual relationship” conveys much about the court’s
misunderstanding of sexual harassment and abuse.96 The only
discussion of the client-victim’s perspective is that she “felt ashamed
and humiliated.”97 This client-victim was in the incredibly painful
position of having lost custody of her child, but the court did not discuss
that fact in any depth.98 Bledsoe’s sole role in this client’s life was to
help her navigate the legal system, but he took advantage of her
vulnerability to make sexually harassing comments and coerce her into
showing him her breasts. For this harassment and exploitation of a
vulnerable client, the discipline board and South Carolina Supreme
Court agreed that a public reprimand was sufficient professional
discipline.
ii.

Becker

In the 2020 case, Matter of Becker, attorney Jonathan Lloyd
Becker was disciplined for making several sexually harassing comments
to a vulnerable child he was supposed to be representing.99 Becker was
found to have committed misconduct and sanctioned with an eightmonth suspension that allowed for his return to practice without further
restrictions.100 Becker had been assigned to serve as an attorney for the
child in a domestic violence civil protection order matter.101 There were
no allegations of sexual abuse, nor any facts pointing to a specific need
to investigate that possibility. During the course of interviewing the
95

Id.
Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 776.
99 180 A.D.3d 1322, 1323- 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020).
100 Id at 1325.
101 Id. at 1324.
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twelve-year-old child, Becker made reference to the child’s genitals,
questioned the child about her “past sexual conduct,” and gave the child
“an explicit description” of a past case he handled as a prosecutor
“involving an adult engaging in criminal sex acts with a minor.”102
Becker then “made a second reference to the child’s genitals prompted
by the child adjusting an article of clothing.”103 Finally, Becker told the
child that she should not discuss the interview with anyone or he could
“end up in trouble.”104
Becker was charged with misconduct by the Attorney Grievance
Committee for these behaviors as well as for inappropriately reviewing
and saving content from the child’s social media accounts.105 Becker
was ultimately found to have engaged in misconduct and subjected to
an eight-month suspension from the practice of law, after which he was
able to return to practice without preconditions.106 The court approved
this sanction after purportedly considering both mitigating and
aggravating factors, including “the vulnerability of the child along with
respondent’s reluctance to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his
misconduct.”107 However, the court’s per curiam decision failed to
mention the harm to this child, the public, or the profession, or the risk
of Becker engaging in similar abuse in the future.108
The court described the facts of this case so vaguely that it is
difficult to understand what actually happened. However, it is clear that
Becker, who was appointed to represent a particularly vulnerable and
traumatized twelve-year-old child in domestic violence court, took the
opportunity to engage in a classic pattern of sexual grooming.109 His
actions included inappropriately discussing sex, the child’s “sexual
history,” an adult engaging in sex acts with a child, and the child’s
genitals (in two separate contexts).110 Becker’s actions demonstrate he
102

Id.
Id.
104 Id.
105 Id at 1323-24.
106
Id. at 325.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 1322.
109 Id. at 1323-24. Grooming is a process of manipulation used by an abuser to gain access and
trust in order to sexually abuse a vulnerable victim, often a child, and reduce the likelihood of
being caught. According to experts, grooming often entails selection of a particularly vulnerable
victim, access and isolation of that victim, developing secrets with the victim, desensitizing the
victim to sexual topics, and an attempt to make this behavior seem natural or normal. Daniel
Pollack & Andrea Maclver, Understanding Sexual Grooming in Child Abuse Cases, 34 CHILD
L. PRAC. 161, 161-68 (2015); see also Grooming: Know the Warning Signs, RAINN (July 10,
2020), https://www.rainn.org/news/grooming-know-warning-signs.
110 Id. at 1323-24
103
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was conscious of his guilt because he told the child he could get in
trouble if she told anyone what they talked about.111 It is difficult to put
into words the egregiousness of Becker’s failure to act in his client’s
interests. Rather than fulfilling his obligations as an attorney, Becker
sexually exploited and groomed the child for his own prurient
gratification. The court’s failure to recognize and name the grooming
behavior or account for the risk it implies for Becker’s future conduct
highlights how out of touch with social mores around accountability for
sexual abuse the attorney discipline process is. Instead, the court simply
took Becker’s word that he changed his office procedures around
interviewing, imposed a brief suspension, and allowed him to resume
his practice of law upon the conclusion of his suspension.112
II.

UNDERSTANDING THE HARM CAUSED BY THIS ABUSE
A. The Me Too Movement, #MeToo, and Time’s Up

The Me Too movement describes a decades-long campaign by
survivors of sexual violence to build solidarity, healing, and
accountability.113 As early as 2005, community activist Tarana Burke
began intentionally using the words “me too” to disclose abuse, validate,
and connect Black and Brown survivors of sexual violence.114
Importantly, Burke’s Me Too work has centered the experiences and
needs of survivors of color.115 Burke has called Me Too “the start of a
larger conversation and a movement for radical community healing.”116
The viral #MeToo phenomenon was characterized by a groundswell of
first-person disclosures of sexual violence beginning in 2017. However,
#MeToo has become a kind of shorthand that is used to describe a
confluence of high-profile moments in society’s ongoing reckoning
with sexual violence.117
111

Id. at 1324-25.
Becker, 180 A.D.3d at 1325-26.
113
Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct.
20,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-taranaburke.html?smid=url-share.
114 TARANA BURKE, UNBOUND: MY STORY OF LIBERATION AND THE BIRTH OF THE ME TOO
MOVEMENT, 12 (2021).
115 Id. at 242; Wexler et al., supra note 3, at 52.
116 Tarana
Burke
(@TaranaBurke),
TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/taranaburke/status/919704949751255040? (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
117 Here are just a few examples: In June 2016, Chanel Miller publicly shared her victim impact
statement (using a pseudonym at the time) after her rapist was sentenced to six months in prison
for sexually assaulting her while she was unconscious, and the judge bemoaned the loss of the
112
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In October 2017, after news of film producer Harvey
Weinstein’s serial sexual abuse of women over whom he held
professional power went public,118 actor Alyssa Milano used Twitter to
call on survivors of sexual violence to disclose their experiences.119
Twitter users, including many celebrities,120 responded to Milano’s call
in droves using the hashtag #MeToo.121 The hashtag quickly gained
visibility as tens of thousands of survivors disclosed sexual abuse they
had experienced.122 Milano’s initial call was for survivors to come
together and demonstrate the scope of the issue of sexual violence.123
However, without the work of movement building and leadership, the
hashtag was not a unified movement but a vehicle for millions of
individual social media users to speak out for their own reasons, which
seemed to include solidarity, catharsis, protest, retribution, and
others.124 Burke was troubled by a lack of Black stories in #MeToo,

rapist’s Stanford University swimming scholarship. Christine Hauser, Brock Turner Loses
Appeal to Overturn Sexual Assault Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/us/brock-turner-appeal.html. In August 2016, the first
report of abuse by Larry Nassar against a gymnast was published. Those allegations led to a
massive prosecution and conviction of Nassar, and passage of the Safe Sport Authorization Act.
David Woods, Four Years Later, How the Larry Nassar and USA Gymnastics Scandals
Continue, INDYSTAR (June 24, 2020), https://www.indystar.com/story/sports/2020/06/24/larrynassar-usa-gymnastics-scandal-still-ripples-four-years-later/3232953001/. In November 2016,
Donald Trump was elected president just one month after the release of a recording of him
bragging about sexually assaulting women. Trump defeated the first woman to win a major
party’s presidential nomination, Hillary Clinton. In response, activists organized the Women’s
March to protest Former President Trump’s inauguration in January 2017. Susan Chira &
Yamiche Alcindor, Defiant Voices Flood U.S. Cities as Women Rally for Rights, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/us/women-march-protest-presidenttrump.html?smid=url-share. In the summer of 2017, Kenyette Barnes and Oronike Odeleye
launched #MuteRKelly, an effort to bring attention to numerous allegations that Kelly sexually
abused Black girls and women for decades. Kelly was convicted on several of those allegations
in
2021.
@ajc,
TWITTER
(Sept.
27,
2021,
6:07
PM),
https://twitter.com/ajc/status/1442611800529244162.
118 Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers for
Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harveyweinstein-harassment-allegations.html.
119 “If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.” Alyssa
Milano
(@Alyssa_Milano),
TWITTER,
twitter.com/alyssa_milano/status/919659438700670976?lang=en (last visited April 19, 2022).
120 Anna Codrea-Rado, #MeToo Floods Social Media With Stories of Harassment and Assault,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/technology/metoo-twitterfacebook.html.
121 Id. Although many used the construction #metoo (all lowercase letters), this Article follows
the convention of capitalizing every word in a hashtag to make it more legible for those with
disabilities that affect visual perception and processing.
122 Id.
123 Milano, supra note 119.
124 Codrea-Rado, supra note 120.
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noting that the hashtag seemed to highlight the barriers facing survivors
who are women and girls of color.125
As #MeToo exploded, Burke was undeterred from her
movement-building work.126 Initially, Burke expressed concern that
#MeToo would overshadow what she had built.127 Milano responded to
Burke’s concerns, crediting Burke, and stating that she was not
previously aware of Burke’s work.128 While #MeToo brought
mainstream visibility to Tarana Burke’s Me Too movement, Burke’s
movement retained a distinct vision and character, built from grassroots
organizing efforts by Black and Brown women and girls.129 Burke has
said Me Too was always intended to be a survivor-centered movement
focused on empowerment and healing for Black women and girls.130
While Burke has expressed support for the #MeToo phenomenon and
artfully navigated the interrelationship between her movement and the
hashtag, many BIPOC activists have maintained an uneasy relationship
with what they see as a white-supremacist #MeToo.131
#MeToo reached far beyond social media, fueling a dizzying
series of high-profile news stories exposing men for harassing and
abusing those over whom they held power.132 Some of those disclosures
led to professional or legal consequences for those who had committed
abuse for years with impunity.133 For example, the allegations that
spurred Alyssa Milano to first use the #MeToo hashtag resulted in a
conviction for producer Harvey Weinstein.134 On January 1, 2018, a
group of entertainers launched the Time’s Up movement in an apparent
effort to use the momentum of #MeToo to elevate and support
marginalized women survivors of workplace sexual harassment,

125

Burke, supra note 114, at 242-43.
Id.
127 Garcia, supra note 113.
128 Id.
129 Burke, supra note 114, at 242.
130 Id.
131
Id.
132 Wexler et al., supra note 3, at 49 (discussing high-profile reports of abuse by Travis
Kalanick, Roger Ailes, Bill O’Reilly, and others).
133 See, e.g., Erik Ortiz & Corky Siemaszko, NBC News Fires Matt Lauer After Sexual
Misconduct
Review,
NBC
NEWS
(Nov.
29,
2017,
7:39
AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/nbc-news-fires-today-anchor-mattlauer-after-sexual-misconduct-n824831 (reporting on NBC’s ouster of Lauer for sexual
misconduct); Jan Ransom, Harvey Weinstein Is Found Guilty of Sex Crimes in #MeToo
Watershed,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
24,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/24/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-trial-rape-verdict.html
(reporting on Weinstein’s conviction for sex offenses).
134 Ransom, supra note 133.
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particularly low-wage women and women of color.135 In an open letter,
Time’s Up organizers explained that their effort was in response to
advocacy and organizing by Alianza Nacional de Campesinas.136
Time’s Up focused on legal action and advocacy, giving rise to the
Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund, which provides legal services to
survivors of workplace harassment.137
While many experienced #MeToo as a watershed, its long-term
implications remain to be seen. However, what is clear is the role that
lawyers have occupied in seeking accountability for sexual violence.
Where #MeToo inspired disclosures have resulted in civil lawsuits and
criminal charges against abusers, lawyers have, of course, positioned
themselves as representatives of the victims, the public, and the cause
of justice.138 #MeToo has even driven some self-reflection within the
legal profession.139 However, lawyers have yet to turn #MeToo inspired
scrutiny, accountability, and reform on fellow attorneys who commit
sexual violence against their clients with relative impunity.
B. The Harm of Attorney-Client Sexual Abuse & Harassment
When attorneys sexually abuse and harass their clients, those
clients suffer immediate and lasting harm. When the profession fails to
impose meaningful accountability or redress for that harm, the
profession as a whole suffers. By allowing sexually abusive attorneys to
continue to practice law, the profession places future clients at risk. This
subsection will detail the harm that the client, the profession, and the
public suffer as a result of attorney-client sexual abuse and harassment.
i.

Harm to the Client-Victim

When a client retains an attorney, that client is hiring a trained
and licensed professional to represent their interests and placing trust in
that professional. When the attorney exploits the client’s trust for sexual
amusement or gratification, the client is harmed by the abuse itself as
well as the breach of trust. The client-victim suffers the oftendevastating effects of a sexual assault, harassment, or coercive sexual
Open
Letter
from
Time’s
Up,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
1,
2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/01/arts/02women-letter.html.
136 Id.
137 Yohana Desta, Time’s Up: How a Hollywood Initiative Is Tackling Sexual Predators,
VANITY FAIR (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2018/01/times-upinitiative-sexual-harassment-hollywood.
138 Ricker, supra note 1.
139 See supra note 3.
135
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contact, her underlying legal issue is neglected, and her rights
potentially harmed.
While every victim’s experience is unique, existing literature
sheds significant light on the lasting harm experienced by sexual
harassment and abuse.140 Another harm that arises in cases of attorneyclient sexual violence is the moral injury of a betrayal of trust,
humiliation, and exploitation by someone in a position of power and
trust.141 This violation of trust has been described in analogous contexts,
such as athletics,142 education,143 and religious practice.144 Each of those
contexts involves professionals placed in a special position of trust and
power, similar to that which an attorney holds over their client. The
betrayal of that position of trust is appalling.
In addition to experiencing the harm of the abuse itself, a victim
abused by an attorney will almost certainly receive inferior legal
services that may compromise their rights with respect to the legal case
for which counsel has been retained. An attorney who is subjugating the
client’s interests to the attorney’s own sexual gratification is not
simultaneously capable of making responsible lawyering choices.145
The attorney is likely to miss strategic opportunities and otherwise fail
the interests of the client. The attorney cannot maintain client loyalty
while engaging in sexual exploitation of that client.146 An attorney
whose judgment and integrity are so lapsed as to commit these offenses
is likely to expose a client to legal harm as a secondary result of sexual
harassment or abuse. Further, sexual harassment and abuse is
profoundly deleterious to the rapport, trust, and collaboration necessary
See, e.g., Daniel Maggen, “When You’re a Star”: The Unnamed Wrong of Sexual
Degradation, 109 GEO. L.J. 581, 615-17 (2021) (explaining the harm of sexual degradation);
Robin West, Consensual Sexual Dysphoria: A Challenge for Campus Life, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC.
804, 809-13 (2017) (explaining the harm of unwanted sex); Luis E. Chiesa, Sexual Lynching,
29 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 764-78 (2020) (discussing both the individual and social
harm of rape, particularly against marginalized groups).
141 John M. O’Connell, Keeping Sex Out of the Attorney-Client Relationship: A Proposed Rule,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 887 (1992).
142 See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Going Outside Title IX to Keep Coach-Athlete Relationships in
Bounds, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 395, 416 (2012) (noting that breach of trust defines the harm
when a coach sexually abuses an athlete).
143 See, e.g., Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty to Protect: Blackstone’s Doctrine of In Loco
Parentis: A Lens for Viewing the Sexual Abuse of Students, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17, 17
(2002) (discussing the violation of trust that occurs when a teacher sexually abuses a student).
144 See, e.g., Emily C. Short, Torts: Praying for the Parish or Preying on the Parish? Clergy
Sexual Misconduct and the Tort of Clergy Malpractice, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 183, 194 (2004)
(discussing clergy sexual abuse as a violation of parishioner trust).
145 See infra Section III.A.
146 Abed Awad, Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 131, 171-177 (1997/1998)
(examining the effect that attorney-client sexual relations have on conflict of interest in the
attorney-client relationship).
140
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for a functioning attorney-client relationship. An attorney who is
exploiting their client cannot expect that client to disclose important
facts or trust counsel’s advice. That client will necessarily receive
inferior legal services as a result of that diminished trust.
Under the current attorney discipline regime, client-victims are
likely to experience additional harm if they choose to report sexual
abuse or harassment by their attorney to the bar. Specifically, a clientvictim is likely to experience the harm of having their interests failed by
a system not designed to consider the client-victim’s needs, experience,
and perspective as part of an ethics inquiry.147 Although attorney
discipline is not meant to vindicate the rights of client-victims,148 that
does not mean client-victims should be marginalized in ethics
proceedings. Research indicates that procedural justice is meaningful to
victims.149 In a criminal justice context, sexual violence is
underreported as compared to other crimes; but when victims do report,
they do so for a variety of reasons including validation, accountability,
and prevention of future harm to others.150
Going through the process of reporting or cooperating with an
ethics investigation or prosecution only to see the abuser allowed to
commit more harm would likely be profoundly upsetting for many
client-victims. Disregarding victims’ needs, experiences, and
perspectives is particularly problematic when the system demands
participation from the victim in the form of interviews or testimony,
which have the potential to retraumatize the client-victim without any
promise of meaningful justice. This disregard can be especially
damaging when a client-victim has made a disclosure and cooperated
with the process under the hope of justice or vindication.

147

See infra Part III.B.i and ii.
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS § III.A (1986,
amended
1992)
[hereinafter
STANDARDS
FOR
IMPOSING
SANCTIONS],
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/sanc
tion_standards.pdf. See also Fred C. Zacharias, The Purpose of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 675 (2003) (discussing purpose of attorney discipline system without mention of
redress of harm to victims).
149 See Irina Elliott, Stuart D.M. Thomas & James R.P. Ogloff, Procedural Justice in Contacts
with the Police: The Perspective of Victims of Crime, 13 POLICE PRACTICE & RSCH. 437, 446
(2012) (concluding results of Australian study “suggest that what is of particular importance to
victims is the police willingness to do their best to achieve a desired outcome”).
150 Oona Brooks-Hay, Doing the “Right Thing”? Understanding Why Rape Victim-Survivors
Report to the Police, 15 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 174, 179 (2020) (summarizing literature on
why victims report rape).
148
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Harm to the Public & Profession

The attorney discipline system is intended to protect the public
and the profession from attorneys who are not fit to practice law.151 As
was discussed in Part I above, the discipline system is apparently failing
to carry out its protective purpose in sexual misconduct cases.152
Attorneys who sexually abuse and harass their clients harm the legal
profession, and the systemic failure to hold these attorneys accountable
and honor the perspective and needs of victims compounds that harm.
Lawyers sexually abusing clients with impunity is egregious for many
reasons, not least of which is that it interrupts fundamental access to
justice. Retaining competent legal services is a fundamental part of
exercising one’s rights in our legal system. A system that allows this
abuse and fails to adequately address it compromises the interests of
justice not only for individual victims but for all those seeking to hire
an attorney. By failing to do all that we can to make this profession safe
for its clients, lawyers make it harder for potential clients to obtain legal
services and access justice.
When lawyers sexually abuse and harass their clients, the
integrity of the bar is directly diminished. That diminishment is
compounded when such abuse and harassment is excused and abetted
through lenient professional sanctions. Further, when the discipline
system returns abusive attorneys to practice, those attorneys are
empowered to commit more harm in the future. Although attorney
discipline is public,153 it is not often publicized. If the public were more
aware of this issue, the profession’s reputation might suffer even more.
Further, the direct harm to client-victims discussed above has
secondary effects for the profession and the public. A profession that
mistreats its clients and disregards their need for redress is not deserving
of public trust. An attorney discipline system that is perceived by the
public as unjust compromises the public’s trust in the profession overall.
A system that fails to issue significant consequences to attorneys, fails
to fully account for harm caused by members of the profession, and fails
to incorporate the victim’s experience, needs, and perspective is not
likely to be perceived as just or fair. The cases discussed in Part I raise
important questions of bias and protectionism in the attorney discipline
151

Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States,
7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 916, 916 n.33 (1994).
152 “The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the administration
of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely properly to
discharge their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal
profession.” STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS, supra note 148, § III.A.
153 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS, supra note 148, § III.A.
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system. Ultimately, such questions undermine the integrity and
trustworthiness of the legal profession, which seems to care more about
protecting its members than accounting for the harm those members
have done.
III.

CAPACITY OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM TO RESPOND TO THIS
HARM

The attorney discipline system in its current professionalized
form is relatively new. Prior to 1970, attorney discipline was generally
handled by volunteer attorneys and administered by bar associations.154
Prior to 1908, there was essentially no organized attorney discipline
system to speak of; instead, judges handled attorney misconduct on an
ad hoc basis.155 The current system evolved out of a series of national
reform efforts, including the 1970 Clark Report and the 1989 McKay
Report.156 Throughout the many reforms and updates that have been
made to the attorney discipline system, there has been near universal
agreement that the primary purpose of attorney discipline is not to
punish the attorney found to have committed misconduct.157 Instead,
attorney discipline is designed to maintain the integrity of the profession
and protect the public from incompetent and ill-intentioned attorneys.158
Many courts have also noted that deterrence is an important—though
not primary—purpose of ethics sanctions.159

154

See Devlin, supra note 151, at 919-22 (discussing attorney discipline systems in the United
States before the 1970 Clark Committee report).
155 See id. at 917-18 (discussing the evolution of attorney discipline systems in the
United States).
156 Id. at 927-28, 930 (discussing the 1970 Clark Report and the 1989 McKay Report and the
influences they had on the current attorney discipline system).
157 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Purpose of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675,
677 (2003) (stating that “[c]ourts that have analyzed professional discipline typically have
characterized its purpose as ‘protecting the public.’”); Devlin, supra note 151, at 916.
158 Devlin, supra note 151, at 916, 916 n.33; State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Stout, 451 P.3d
155, 157-58 (Okla. 2019).
159 Devlin, supra note 151, at 385. For a detailed exploration of the purposes of attorney
discipline, see ANNOTATED STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, 1-13 (Ellyn S.
Rosen ed., 2d ed. 2019) and Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 675 (2003).
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A. Existing Rules & Standards
i. Rules of Professional Conduct
Sexual abuse of a client by an attorney not only is wrong—
sometimes criminal—but also represents a slew of violations of rules of
professional conduct. Similarly, sexual harassment of a client violates
many rules of professional conduct, even when it does not violate
criminal laws.160 This subsection will discuss how this behavior violates
existing ethical rules.
Competence. Sexual abuse or harassment of a client by an
attorney implicates the attorney’s duty of competence under Model Rule
1.1.161 An attorney who is sexually abusing or harassing a client is not
providing “competent representation to [that] client”162 because the
attorney is directly harming the client. Rule 1.1 is not a common basis
for discipline against an attorney who sexually abuses or harasses their
client. However, given the importance of the duty of competence and
the inherent abrogation of that duty in cases of attorney-client sexual
violence, Rule 1.1 should be cited in all such discipline cases.
Personal conflict of interest. Sexual abuse or harassment of a
client by an attorney is a personal conflict of interest because the
attorney is placing their own interest ahead of the client’s and actively
harming the client. An attorney cannot adequately represent a client’s
interests and victimize that client for sexual gratification within the
same attorney-client relationship. Model Rule 1.7 bars concurrent
conflicts of interest,163 specifying that a concurrent conflict exists when
“there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer.”164
Comment 10 further explains: “The lawyer’s own interests should not
be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.”165
Independent professional judgment. Sexual abuse of a client by
an attorney represents a failure of the lawyer’s duty of independent
professional judgment. Model Rule 2.1 states: “In representing a client,
a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render

160

See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., Md. Rules § 19-301.7 cmt. 12 (West 2016) (stating ways in which
an attorney can violate the rules of professional conduct without violating criminal laws).
161 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
162 Id.
163 Id. at r. 1.7.
164 Id.
165 Id. at r. 1.7 cmt. 10.
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candid advice.”166 An attorney who is exploiting a client for sexual
gratification is not exercising independent professional judgment.
Integrity of the profession. Model Rule 8.4 offers a catch-all
definition of misconduct that includes several specific provisions that
may apply in cases of attorney-client sexual violence. First, all forms of
sexual violence towards clients violate Model Rule 8.4 (g), which bars
harassment or discrimination based on a number of characteristics
including, “[s]ex . . . sexual orientation, [or] gender identity . . . in
conduct related to the practice of law.”167 Second, this behavior violates
Model Rule 8.4(d) which bars “conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.” As discussed in Section II.B above, sexual
violence against clients is necessarily prejudicial to the administration
of justice. Finally, this behavior may or may not violate Model Rule
8.4(b) which bars “a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness.” This Article argues that the
applicability of criminal law should not be overemphasized as a basis of
discipline in sexual misconduct cases involving client victims.
Sexual conflict of interest. Sexual abuse of a client by an attorney
is a violation of Model Rule 1.8(j), which prohibits “sexual relations
with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between
them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.”168 A comment
to the model rule indicates that attorney-client sexual contact
compromises the attorney’s fiduciary responsibility and can violate an
attorney’s “basic ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client to
the client’s disadvantage.”169 The concept of sexual conflict of interest
is built upon other professional responsibilities, such as independent
professional judgment and the protection of client confidences.
Therefore, violations of Model Rule 1.8(j) may also be violations of
those other professional duties and the rules associated with them.170
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
Id. at r. 8.4(g).
168 Id. at r. 1.8(j). A nuance to rule 1.8(j) is articulated in comment 22: “When the client is an
organization, paragraph (j) of this Rule prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside
counsel or outside counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a constituent of the
organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the
organization’s legal matters.” Id. at r. 1.8 cmt. 22.
169 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021).
170 Id. (“In addition, such a relationship presents a significant danger that, because of the
lawyer’s emotional involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client without
impairment of the exercise of independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line
between the professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict to what
extent client confidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, since
client confidences are protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context of the
client-lawyer relationship.”).
166
167
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Although this Article and the American Bar Association (ABA) posit
that attorney-client sex generally violates many other ethical
provisions,171 the sexual conflict of interest provision provides clarity
and eliminates the need to navigate challenging factual, evidentiary, and
legal issues.
Twelve states do not have a sexual conflict of interest
provision.172 Despite critiques from scholars173 and reform attempts,174
those twelve states have declined to enact an express ban on attorneyclient sex.175 Instead, those states rely on a subjective, flexible
standard176 or do not mention attorney-client sex in their ethics rules.177
Curiously, though Georgia does not ban attorney-client sex, it does
prohibit attorneys from accepting sexual favors as payment for
services.178 This is a somewhat poetic illustration of the true priorities
of the rules of professional responsibility.

171

See id. (suggesting other ethical rules that could be violated because of an attorney-client
sexual relationship).
172 GA. R. & REGS. St. Bar 1.8 (2022); LA. STAT. ANN. § 37-4-1.8 (2015); MD. CODE ANN., Md.
Rules § 19-301.8 (West 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 3, § 3:07-1.8 (West 2015); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT.1.8 (West 2022); MISS. CODE ANN. § MI. RULES
OF CT. STATE-MI. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT-r. 1.8(West 2022); N.J. STAT. ANN. § Part I:1.8
(West 2022); R.I. STATE CT. RULES R.I. GEN. LAWS § SUP. CT. RULES-ART. V-r. 1.8; S.C. CODE
ANN. § IV-407-1.8 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § Sup. Ct. Rules-R. 8-RPC 1.8 (West 2022); TEX.
JUD. BRANCH CODE ANN. § 9 r. 1.8 (West 2022); VA. CODE ANN. § 6-II r. 1.8 (West 2022).
173 See, e.g., Malinda L. Seymore, Attorney-Client Sex: A Feminist Critique of the Absence of
Regulation, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 175, 175-77 (2003).
174 Debra Cassens Weiss, Texas Lawyers Reject Ban on Sex with Clients, ABA J. (February 22,
2011)
5:36
PM,
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/texas_lawyers_reject_ban_on_sex_with_clients.
175 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § IV-407-1.8(m) (2020) (“A lawyer shall not have sexual relations
with a client when the client is in a vulnerable condition or is otherwise subject to the control or
undue influence of the lawyer, when such relations could have a harmful or prejudicial effect
upon the interests of the client, or when sexual relations might adversely affect the lawyer’s
representation of the client.”); MD. CODE ANN., Md. Rules § 19-301.7 cmt. 12 (West 2016) (“A
sexual relationship with a client, whether or not in violation of criminal law, will create an
impermissible conflict between the interests of the client and those of the attorney if (1) the
representation of the client would be materially limited by the sexual relationship and (2) it is
unreasonable for the attorney to believe the attorney can provide competent and diligent
representation. Under those circumstances, informed consent by the client is ineffective.”).
177 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 3, § 3:07-1.8 (West 2015) (indicating Massachusetts
has no rule banning attorneys from having sex with their clients).
178 GA. R. & REGS. St. Bar 1.5 cmt. 1A (2022) (stating that attorneys may not accept
sexual favors as payment for services).
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ii. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions provide
guidance on how to enforce ethics rules.179 Sexual misconduct is not
directly addressed in the Standards.180 However, the ABA Center for
Professional Responsibility’s Annotated Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions publication provides relevant annotation.181 That
annotation states that courts generally impose suspension for sexual
conflicts of interest and criminal sexual misconduct on adult victims
(including clients).182 Interestingly, Standard 5.1, which addresses
criminal acts, recommends disbarment for certain criminal acts of
dishonesty, drug trafficking, and intentional homicide, but not for rape
or any other sex crime.183 Thus, on their face, the Standards take selling
drugs more seriously than raping a client.
Nonetheless, there are several other standards that could be used
to support severe sanctions for attorney-client sexual misconduct. For
example, disbarment is appropriate when the lawyer represents a client
“knowing that the lawyer’s interests are adverse to the client’s with the
intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially
serious injury to the client.”184 When a lawyer sexually exploits a client
for the lawyer’s gratification, the lawyer is engaging in representation
with adverse personal interests, with the intent to benefit the lawyer, and
causing serious injury to the client. The Standards also state that
disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer violates a professional duty
“with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes
serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal
system.”185 Again, sexual predation on a client causes harm, is done for
the lawyer’s own benefit, and violates many professional duties.
B. Obstacles to Fair Outcomes
Despite the theoretical strength of existing ethics rules as applied
to attorneys who sexually harass and abuse their clients,186 ethics boards

179

See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS, supra note 148.
Id.
181 ANNOTATED STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, 184-85, 268-71 (Ellyn S. Rosen
ed., 2d ed. 2019).
182 Id.
183 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS, supra note 148, § 5.11.
184 Id. § 4.31.
185 Id. § 7.1.
186 As noted above, Model Rule 1.8(j) is not universally adopted by states. See supra
text accompanying note 172.
180
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and courts have failed to use those rules to hold abusive attorneys fully
accountable, as illustrated by the examples provided in Part I and similar
cases.187 The following subsections will explore the primary reasons for
that failure.
i.

Protectionism

Discipline cases against attorneys who sexually harass and abuse
their clients are shaped by overidentification between adjudicators and
disciplinary respondents. In cases like those discussed in Part I above,
much emphasis is placed on the respondent’s subjective experience,
including remorse.188 Empathy towards the client-victims is limited.189
The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions encourage this
marginalization of the victim’s point of view in several ways.
Specifically, the ABA’s list of mitigating and aggravating factors is set
up to encourage taking the attorney’s perspective and considering the
attorney’s subjective experience, but not doing the same with the victim.
The list of mitigating factors includes several that pertain to the
subjective experience or perspective of the attorney, including personal
or emotional problems, good faith remedial efforts, cooperative attitude,
character, chemical dependency, and remorse.190 The list of aggravating
factors includes just one that pertains to the subjective experience or
perspective of the victim: vulnerability of the victim.191

187

See supra Part I. See also, e.g., Akron Bar Ass’n v. Fortado, 152 N.E.3d 196 (Ohio 2020)
(issuing a one year stayed suspension for attorney who engaged in a “sexual relationship” with
a client who was particularly vulnerable due to mental illness, loss of visitation with her
children, past sexual exploitation, and financial distress); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Jacobsma, 920 N.W.2d 813 (Iowa 2018) (issuing a thirty-day suspension for an attorney
who had “sexual relationship” with a client); Disciplinary Counsel v. Mason, 128 N.E.3d 183
(issuing a six month actual suspension for an attorney convicted of solicitation and who had
“sexual relationship” with divorce client); Matter of Disciplinary Proc. Against Hanes, 951
N.W.2d 426 (increasing suspension from two years to four years after disciplinary authority
sought ninety-day suspension for attorney convicted of sexually assaulting prospective client).
188 E.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Stout, 451 P.3d 155, 156-60 (Okla. 2019) (amplifying
discipline board’s focus on respondent’s expressions of “sincere” and “deep” remorse, sex
addiction, and cooperation with authorities).
189 E.g., Matter of Becker, 180 A.D.3d 1322 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (imposing eight-month
suspension with no mention of child client-victim’s subjective experience or emotional reaction
to being sexually harassed by lawyer); Matter of Bledsoe, 811 S.E.2d 775 (S.C. 2018)
(approving sanction of public reprimand with no analysis of client-victim’s subjective
experience or the fact that she felt “ashamed and humiliated” after being coerced into showing
respondent her breasts); Stout, 451 P.3d at 156 (imposing a three-month suspension for sexual
harassment and abuse of two clients with minimal mention of client-victims’ perspective).
190 STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS, supra note 148, § 9.32.
191 Id. § 9.22 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1986, amended 1992).
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This systemic inequity between offending lawyer and clientvictim synergizes with overidentification arising from the selfregulating nature of the legal profession.192 Discipline boards are
comprised primarily of attorneys who judge the misconduct of their
peers.193 Non-attorney members must be selected and approved through
established legal institutions. Therefore, even lay board members have
been deemed acceptable by members of the legal profession. Whereas
ethics boards and the bench are dominated by lawyers, client-victims
are generally non-lawyers and naturally “other” to the majority of board
members and judges. Thus, discipline boards and the appellate courts
that review ethics decisions may tend towards lighter sanctions for
attorneys in part because they relate to attorney-respondents more than
victimized clients. This imbalance likely compounds with other
stereotypes and biases that operate throughout the justice system 194 to
disadvantage people of color, disabled people, LGBTQ+ people,
women, and others with marginalized identities. Given that the legal
profession is dominated by white men195 with relatively high economic
status,196 ethics boards are likely shaped by those identities.
ii.

Minimization of Harm

Although the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
recommend stronger sanctions when attorneys cause serious harm,197
the ethics rules and standards do not adequately prioritize or support the
needs of sexual violence survivors who come forward to report their
192 See Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 124750 (2003) (explaining ways in which law is a self-regulating profession).
193 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 753, TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.02.
194 See Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal
System, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1563, 1576-80 (2013) (surveying bias in various parts of the
legal system, including among lawyers and judges).
195 ABA data indicate that in 2021, 63% of all lawyers were men and 85% were non-Hispanic
white, while 5% were African American, 5% were Hispanic, 2% were Asian, and <1% were
Native American. ABA National Lawyer Population Survey, AM. BAR ASS’N (2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/2021-nationallawyer-population-survey.pdf.
196 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports median annual pay for lawyers at $148,030 and
median annual pay for all occupations at $58,260. U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., National
Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: United States, MAY 2021 OCCUPATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/oes/2021/may/oes_nat.htm (Mar.
31, 2022) (listing lawyer data under occupation code 23-1011 and data for all occupations under
occupation code 00-0000).
197 E.g., STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING SANCTIONS, supra note 148, § 4.3 (recommending
admonition for conflicts of interest that cause little or no injury, suspension for conflicts of
interest that cause injury, and disbarment for conflicts that cause serious injury).
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abusive attorneys.198 The voice of the victim is too often minimized, and
ethics boards fail to conduct thorough fact-finding regarding harm to
clients who are sexually harassed and abused by their attorneys. Without
robust factual findings, harm cannot be properly assessed when
imposing sanctions at the board level, and appellate courts are limited
in their ability to fully consider harm in their review of sanctions. As a
result, appellate courts reviewing sexual misconduct sanctions often
spend only a few words discussing the victim’s statements about what
happened or the harm the victim experienced.199
In addition to minimizing the victim’s voice and falling short of
a full accounting of harm, many ethics boards are unwilling to describe
actual acts of sexual misconduct with precision or detail. Often, it is
difficult to understand what the respondent attorney actually did to the
client because such vague language is used. Sexual misconduct is
described using euphemistic, indirect language such as “sexually
suggestive photographs” or “unwanted sexual advances.”200 When a
court, as in Stout, says an attorney made “unwanted sexual advances,”
it is not clear what that means.201 Depending on the court’s
understanding of sexual consent, a “sexual advance” might include
anything from a verbal suggestion or request for sexual contact to
rubbing, grabbing, groping, kissing, or other physical touch.202
Similarly, adjudicators use language that implies consent without facts
to support that implication. For example, in one case, the court said an
attorney was “interested in a sexual relationship”203 with his client, and
in another, the court said a client “wound up having sex” with her
attorney.204 This glaring imprecision may hide the severity of an
198

Ebright, supra note 4, at 72.
See supra note 189.
200 Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Stout, 451 P.3d 155, 156 (Okla. 2019).
201 Id. at 156.
202 Although a dictionary definition of sexual advance focuses on verbal statements, Advance,
MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003), courts have used “sexual
advance” to refer to physical acts, including sexual assault. See, e.g., Matter of Robertson, 78
N.E.3d 1090 (Ind. 2016) (disciplining an attorney for appearing in court intoxicated and making
unspecified “repeated physical sexual advances” towards the court’s receptionist); Panepinto v.
Grievance Comm. of Eighth Jud. Dist., 192 A.D.3d 21, 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (suspending
a lawyer and state senator for one year for misconduct including unspecified “unwanted verbal
and physical sexual advances” towards a staff member); State v. Newman, 965 N.W.2d 182
(Wis. Ct. App. 2021) (criminal case in which court refers to “numerous unwanted sexual
advances . . . including grabbing [victim]’s genitals”); Omnitech Inst., Inc. v. Norwood, 861
S.E.2d 145, 146 (Ga. 2021), cert. denied (Feb. 1, 2022) (sexual harassment case in which court
refers to plaintiff’s allegation of “multiple unwanted sexual advances toward her, including
grabbing and rubbing against her”).
203 Matter of Bledsoe, 811 S.E.2d 775, 776 (S.C. 2018).
204 Stout, 451 P.3d at 157.
199
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attorney’s misconduct, thus further minimizing the actual harm done to
the client. Vague factual findings and euphemistic language regarding
misconduct and harm also interfere with transparency of the discipline
process—appellate courts cannot accurately evaluate sanctions when
the offending behavior and harm are not clearly and accurately
described.
iii.

Proportionality & Regressive Precedent

Another force that weakens disciplinary consequences in
attorney-client sexual misconduct cases is the doctrine of
proportionality, which requires courts to ensure sanctions are
proportional to misconduct by imposing sanctions similar to what has
previously been imposed in similar cases.205 This approach to
proportionality discourages courts from significantly departing from the
level of sanctions previously imposed for similar misconduct. However,
by using past cases to justify sanctions in sexual misconduct cases,
courts run the risk of importing regressive social norms and beliefs into
their contemporary analysis and judgment. What is considered
appropriate and proportional discipline today may be very different
from what would have been considered appropriate and proportional
one, two, three, or more decades ago.
For example, in the 2018 Sarver case, the Ohio Supreme Court
conducted its proportionality test using several comparable cases,
including one from as early as 1996.206 In that 1996 case, attorney
Michael Booher “engaged in sexual activity” with a client in the jail
meeting room while Booher was representing the client in a felony case
by court appointment.207 For this misconduct, Booher was given a oneyear suspension from the practice of law.208 After reviewing Booher’s
case and several others, the court imposed on Sarver six months of
actual suspension for coercing his indigent criminal defendant client
into sex.209 However, the court made no mention of the fact that
standards of behavior and accountability have evolved since the
E.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Jacobsma, 920 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Iowa
2018) (seeking to achieve consistency of sanctions as compared to prior cases); Disciplinary
Counsel v. Bartels, 87 N.E.3d 155, 156 (Ohio 2016) (considering sanctions imposed in similar
cases when issuing sanctions); In re Cross, 500 P.3d 958, 967 (Wash. 2021) (explaining that
sanctions must be proportional as compared to sanctions in similar cases).
206 Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 119 N.E.3d 405, 410 (Ohio 2018) (citing Disciplinary
Counsel v. Booher, 664 N.E.2d 522 (Ohio 1996).
207 Booher, 664 N.E.2d at 522.
208 Id. at 522-23.
209 Sarver, 119 N.E.3d at 413.
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1990s.210 Constraining today’s sanctions with a proportionality analysis
involving outdated precedent serves to perpetuate the status quo and
slow progress towards real accountability for attorney sexual
misconduct.
iv.

Consent Confusion

Another critical source of trouble in discipline cases involving
attorneys who sexually abuse and harass clients is a misunderstanding
of the power dynamics that undermine sexual consent in an attorneyclient relationship. It is difficult to offer a succinct definition of sexual
consent because the concept is both socially and legally fraught. 211
However, for the sake of discussion, this Article will use a notion of
consent consistent with what Aya Gruber calls the “uncontroversial
sexual consent transaction,” which consists of “(1) A’s internal decision
to have sex; (2) A’s external manifestations of that decision; and (3) B’s
(reasonable) belief, based on the external manifestations and context,
that A is willing to have sex.”212 This construct of consent presumes that
A is capable of freely formulating an internal decision to have sex.213 If
one party fears adverse consequences if they do not consent, that party
is not free to consent. For example, if B has a socially prescribed
position of power and A depends upon B to regain access to her children
or save herself from incarceration, A is not truly free to decline sex with
B.
The relationship between attorney and client is one of
responsibility and professional care.214 Lawyers are granted a
significant amount of power within the legal system, which is one
reason clients hire lawyers. When a client is suffering particularly
difficult circumstances or facing dire legal consequences, the lawyer’s
power is magnified. As the comment to Model Rule 1.8(g) says: “The
relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the
lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The
210

Id. at 410-413.
See generally Gruber, supra note 30 (discussing the wide variety of social and legal
understandings of sexual consent); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 335, 335 (2013) (criticizing consent as the marker of rape and proposing a sexual
autonomy model); Wendy Adele Humphrey, “Let’s Talk About Sex”: Legislating and
Educating on the Affirmative Consent Standard, 50 U.S.F. L. REV. 35 (2016) (tracking the
history and implications of a “yes means yes” affirmative consent standard in a Title IX context).
212 Gruber, supra note 30 at 429.
213 Id at 425.
214 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2021) (noting that the
attorneys owe a fiduciary duty to clients and occupy “the highest position of trust and
confidence.”)
211
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relationship is almost always unequal . . .” Within that unequal
relationship, especially when a client is particularly vulnerable, sexual
consent cannot be given freely.
However, some state criminal laws have much narrower
conceptualizations of non-consent.215 Ethics adjudicators might use
those narrow conceptualizations to excuse or diminish attorney sexual
abuse of clients merely because that abuse does not meet a conservative
criminal law definition of non-consent. Under that narrow definition,
sexual assault occurs only through physical force, threat of bodily harm,
or against a minor or incapacitated victim, or similar circumstances.216
However, that standard fails to capture a wide swathe of harmful sexual
predation that has no place in the legal profession. Although the sexual
conflict of interest rule generally provides that clients are unable to
freely consent to sex with an attorney,217 the leniency of sanctions issued
in these cases would indicate that violations of the ban are not taken
seriously.218
For example, in Sarver, the disciplinary board asserted that the
client-victim was benefitted by the abuse against her.219 The board said,
“not only was there no harm to the client but the client leveraged her
relationship with [Sarver] to get a better plea deal[.]”220 The court
correctly disagreed that being sexually harassed and abused by her
attorney was a benefit to Sarver’s client, J.B. However, the court
ultimately imposed just six months actual suspension.221 It is difficult to
understand how a court could truly believe that six months suspension
was adequate discipline for an attorney who coerced his vulnerable
client into sex multiple times (along with a slew of other misconduct).
Even while proclaiming that Sarver seriously abused J.B., the court
treated the misconduct as relatively minor.
As a self-regulating profession, lawyers can recognize that a
conservative criminal law understanding of consent is an insufficient
guiding light in determining the harm of attorney-client sexual
exploitation. The attorney ethics process need not be constrained by
definitions taken from criminal law, workplace law, education law, or
any other context. Importantly, sexual misconduct need not be criminal
in nature to warrant professional discipline. As a profession, we reserve
215 See Gruber, supra note 30, at 429-30. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5503-05 (2020); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011, 22.021 (West 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.1-27.5(2015).
216 Id.
217 MODEL RULES PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
218
See supra Part I.
219 Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 119 N.E.3d 405, 409 (Ohio 2018).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 413.
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the right to regulate the behavior of our members. Attorneys are
expected to refrain from all sorts of conduct that is legally permissible
in other contexts. For example, attorneys are required to avoid conflicts
of interest,222 ensure their substantive competence before accepting a
case,223 and disclose adverse authority to the court.224 In its selfregulating authority, the bar can decide that it does not allow sex with
current clients under any circumstances. However, for that declaration
to carry meaning, it must be enforced accordingly.
Rather than engage with—and be sidetracked by—the sexual
consent debate occurring in other areas of law, the legal profession has
the ability to draw its own boundaries of propriety using its own
standards. As a profession, we should be outraged by the deep harm
caused by sexual predation, whether by non-consent, coercion, or abuse
of power225 within the attorney-client relationship. Even when behavior
does not violate criminal law, sexual exploitation of a client by an
attorney should be considered a gravely serious form of misconduct.
IV.

ELEMENTS OF A BETTER APPROACH

As indicated in Part I above,226 the aspirations of #MeToo have
failed to reach the attorney discipline system. Given that failure,
affirmative steps must be taken to bring the self-regulation of attorneys
into line with current social norms and values. This section will outline
several proposals to improve professional accountability when attorneys
sexually harass and abuse their clients, assist victims, and prevent such
harms from occurring in the first place.
A. Clarity: Ban Sex with Clients
The first step towards a safer environment for clients is to enact
a categorical ban on attorney-client sex. The fact that there is still any
ambiguity over whether attorneys should be allowed to have sexual
contact with clients is an embarrassment to the profession. Every state
must unambiguously ban sexual contact between attorneys and

MODEL RULES PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
Id. at r 1.1
224 Id. at r 3.3(a)(2).
225 Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, 21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 79
(2010) (discussing the wide range of behaviors termed “sexual abuse of power” that are not
well-captured by existing laws).
226 See supra Part I.
222
223
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clients.227 A bright line sexual conflict of interest rule is critical not only
as a statement about the values of our profession, but also to limit the
influence of both legal and factual disputes around whether a client
consented to sex with the attorney. Disputes over consent can be
difficult to resolve and a bright line rule would significantly reduce such
disputes. This is important for all cases, but particularly when the client
fits into stereotypes that may make them “less credible” as a witness in
a disciplinary proceeding.228
In theory, a percentage of clients may genuinely want to have
sex with their attorneys. These theoretical clients have animated many
opponents of per se bans on attorney-client sex.229 However, even if
clients exist who desire and would be truly unharmed by sexual contact
with their attorneys, the potential disaffection of these theoretical clients
is a small price to pay for the benefits of a per se ban. The theoretical
harm posed to these allegedly amorous clients and their attorneys is
negligible when compared to the harm that is being done to clients by
attorneys who are sexually harassing and abusing them with relative
impunity. The balance of interests weighs in favor of the clarity,
evidentiary, and cultural value of an unambiguous ban.
It is important to note that a per se ban on attorney-client sexual
contact is not a panacea to the problem of attorneys sexually abusing
their clients. Such a ban existed in several of the exemplar cases in Part
I above.230 For example, Ohio had this ban, and Sarver still abused his
client with minimal consequences.231 The value of an outright ban is that
it sends a message that attorney-client sex is not a gray area. A ban also
creates an administrable parameter for bad behavior and makes it easier
to impose accountability in some cases. However, because a ban alone
will not solve the problems outlined in this Article, the following

227 The single well-developed exception to the sexual conflict of interest doctrine is when a
lawyer has a long-established sexual relationship with someone who then becomes a client, such
as when one spouse or sexual partner performs legal work for the other. MODEL RULES PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.8(j) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). Whether attorneys should be allowed to provide legal
services to their sexual partners, such as spouses, at all raises questions of competence,
objectivity, and professionalism that are beyond the scope of this Article.
228 See, e,g., Gillian Chadwick & Steffany Sloan, An Evidence-Based Approach to Coercive
Control in “High-Conflict” Custody Litigation, FAM. L. Q. (forthcoming 2022) (summarizing
the literature on skepticism towards the credibility of victims of gender-based violence).
229 See, e.g., Bower & Stern, supra note 8, at 541 (arguing that Model Rule 1.8(j) is
overinclusive); Mischler, supra note 22, at 210-11 (criticizing the ethical ban on attorneyclient sex); Feiser, supra note 22, at 54-55 (“Some claim that while preventing attorney
exploitations and abuses of the legal relationship are laudable goals, any per se ban on sexual
relationships necessarily sweeps too broadly into personal relationships . . .”).
230 See supra Part I.
231 Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 119 N.E.3d 405, 413 (Ohio 2018).
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subsection will address more steps that must be taken to make the
attorney-client relationship safer from sexual violence.
B. Accountability
Clients are entitled to expect that they will be free from all forms
of sexual abuse and exploitation at the hands of their attorneys. Cases
like those discussed in Part I indicate that attorney-client sexual violence
is not being adequately addressed by the existing attorney discipline
system,232 despite multiple ethical rules that address this misconduct,233
and ABA guidance that suggests serious consequences are appropriate
for this misconduct.234 The profound harm addressed in this Article calls
for a bold solution.235 One such bold solution is to create mechanisms
to reliably drive serious disciplinary consequences for attorneys who
sexually prey on their clients. Because American Bar Association
guidance like the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions plays a
pivotal role in shaping ethics policy across the country, the ABA has the
opportunity to chart a new course for accountability on attorney-client
sexual misconduct.236 Whether led by the ABA or not, states have the
power to directly implement changes through their disciplinary
procedures, and courts can make change by evolving their approach to
judicial review of attorney sanctions.
i.

Strict Liability for Attorney-Client Sexual Contact

The first step in improving disciplinary accountability for sexual
misconduct against clients is to eliminate any doubt that sexual contact
between attorney and client is misconduct per se and attorneys are
responsible for that misconduct. Assuming implementation of a
universal ban, as proposed in Part IV.A. above, violations of that ban
should always be considered disciplinary offenses. Instead of becoming
stymied in the morass of consent-versus-non-consent on a case-by-case
basis, attorney discipline proceedings must begin with the presumption
that attorney-client sex is deeply harmful to the client, the profession,
and the public. With that axiom in place, attorneys who have sexual
contact with their clients under any circumstances are committing an
232

See supra Part I.
See supra Part III.
234 Id.
235 See supra Part II.B.
236 ANNOTATED STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, xi (Ellyn S. Rosen ed., 2d ed.
2019) (noting that many jurisdictions follow ABA guidance in shaping their disciplinary
systems).
233
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ethical offense.237 One way to frame that ethical offense would be that
clients do not have capacity to consent to sex with their attorneys.
However, non-consent need not be the sine qua non of attorney sexual
misconduct. A more comprehensive approach would be to consider
attorneys strictly liable for the disciplinary offense of attorney-client
sexual contact.
ii.

Presumptive Disbarment for Attorney-Client Sexual
Contact

Building on the notion of strict liability, disciplinary authorities
should impose presumptive disbarment for attorneys who have any
sexual contact with their clients. Although overly prescriptive sanctions
are sometimes disfavored,238 the systemic shortfalls described in this
Article require an approach outside the status quo. Discretionary
sanctions have failed. In order to address the laxity in discipline for this
form of sexual misconduct, presumptive discipline levels should be
imposed as a matter of policy.
The presumption of disbarment would apply in all cases of
attorney-client sexual contact. Policy makers who find such a
presumption draconian could make the presumption rebuttable—
resulting in suspension rather than disbarment—upon a showing by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the attorney-client relationship
was characterized by equity (such as in financial status and client’s
ability to easily retain other counsel if desired) or dominance by the
client (such as a client who attacked the attorney), (2) the client was not
particularly vulnerable to influence by the attorney, (3) the sexual
contact was subjectively wanted by the client, and (4) the client
experienced no lasting harm from the sexual contact. Factual findings
would be required on each of those points and the attorney’s testimony
alone could not constitute clear and convincing evidence of any of these
elements as the attorney is not competent or reliable on these points.

237

Except, perhaps, as discussed in note 215 above.
See ANNOTATED STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS at xx (noting that the
standards are intended as a framework and not intended to prescribe a specific sanction for every
type of misconduct). See also, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. O’Brien, 971
N.W.2d 584, 591 (Iowa 2022), as amended (Mar. 21, 2022). Iowa Supreme Court has “no
standard sanction for particular types of misconduct.” Id.
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Presumptive Actual Suspension for Non-Contact Sexual
Harassment

Similarly, non-contact sexual harassment against clients, such as verbal
sexual harassment, should carry presumptive discipline of actual
suspension.239 Presumptive actual suspension would still provide
adjudicators with significant discretion to impose suspension ranging
from days to years. Given the breadth of behavior represented by noncontact sexual harassment, it is appropriate for adjudicators to have
some leeway to impose different suspension lengths. However, in light
of the issues raised in Part III.B.ii above, adjudicators should not rely
upon regressive precedent in making a proportionality assessment.
Instead, ethics boards and courts must filter precedent through current
standards of decency and accountability. Default sanctions for sexual
misconduct would serve to recalibrate the proportionality scale for both
physical and non-physical offenses by providing strong baseline
sanctions levels.
C. Justice: Prioritizing Survivors
While the attorney discipline process is not intended to directly
vindicate victims’ rights,240 it is intended to maintain integrity of the
profession and protect the public from unfit and dangerous attorneys.
Part of maintaining integrity of the profession is assuring the public the
attorney discipline system is fair and effective. Maintaining integrity of
the profession means creating an process by which a client who has been
subjected to sexual violence by their attorney has the opportunity to air
grievances, be treated fairly, and obtain some level of justice. The legal
profession has a moral imperative to fully acknowledge and account for
the harm that is done in attorney-client sexual misconduct cases—not in
the interest of retribution, but integrity and truth-telling. Currently,
client-victims’ voices are marginalized in the attorney discipline process
and their suffering is minimized. That needs to change. To create that
change, the system must make the client-victim’s experience,
perspective, and needs considered central to attorney discipline in
sexual misconduct cases in the following ways.
First, the system must place more importance on the clientvictim’s experience in attorney discipline proceedings for sexual
misconduct. The client-victim must have the opportunity to be heard
and their story must be valued. This can happen in a multitude of ways.
239
240

Actual suspension is distinguishable from stayed suspension.
See supra note 148.
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For example, boards and courts could be required to consider and make
specific factual findings with respect to the client-victim. Those findings
might include specific vulnerabilities, such as racial and gender identity,
immigration status, age, indigency, the type of underlying case, state of
mind, and harm resulting from the misconduct. States might provide the
client-victim with specially trained pro bono counsel or a victim
advocate to assist the client-victim in the proceedings. The ABA could
issue guidance encouraging jurisdictions to make such changes.
Second, the attorney discipline system must elevate the clientvictim’s perspective. Mechanisms must be put in place to correct for the
overidentification between ethics adjudicators and attorneys who
perpetrate sexual violence discussed in Part III.B.i and ii above. A
requirement that adjudicators make specific factual findings pertaining
to the victim (as discussed in the preceding paragraph) would also be
useful in encouraging adjudicators to relate to the client-victim’s
perspective. Additionally, the ABA could amend the list of aggravating
factors in the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions to add factors
that center on the victim’s perspective. Such factors might include: a
minor victim, psychological coercion, and severity of emotional,
financial, and legal harm to the victim.241
Third, to build a truly fair attorney discipline response to sexual
violence against clients, client-victim’s needs must be addressed. The
attorney discipline system must recognize and mitigate the toll that
reporting, being interviewed, and testifying has on victims.242 Sexual
abuse and harassment victims are often highly reticent to report their
abusers to anyone, whether law enforcement or a disciplinary board.243
The reasons for that reticence are myriad and include fear of being
disbelieved, fear of becoming embroiled in a burdensome and painful
process, and lack of hope for any meaningful resolution.244 Victims who
do disclose sexual harassment and abuse by attorneys are doing a great
service to the legal profession and should be treated accordingly. As
such, the attorney discipline system must provide fully funded victim
services to support those who make the courageous decision to report.
Those services include mental health counseling, support groups,
medical treatment, legal services, and other services.

241

Existing references to harm in the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions have proven
insufficient. Given the traction that the ABA’s aggravating and mitigating factors have gotten
in caselaw, adding harm as an aggravating factor may be more effective. STANDARDS FOR
IMPOSING SANCTIONS, supra note 148, § 9.22.
242 Brooks-Hay, supra note 150, at 176.
243 Id. at 175-76.
244 Id. at 176.
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Skeptics may argue that given the purposes of the discipline
system, the victim’s experience, perspective, and needs should not guide
these proceedings. However, both protection of the public and the
integrity of the profession are served by centering the victim’s voice in
the attorney discipline process. The victim is an important member of
the public who has been harmed by the attorney’s misconduct. The legal
profession cannot expect the public to feel trust in lawyers or the legal
system when the profession’s mechanism of self-regulation ignores and
marginalizes the victim. A victim-centered process will strengthen the
integrity and values of the profession by ensuring that we truly
acknowledge and account for the harm that has been done by the
attorney in question.
D. Prevention: Probation, Conditions & Abuse Prevention
Protocols
The reforms discussed in subparts A and B above will improve
the legal profession’s response to sexual violence committed by
attorneys against clients. However, the best solution to attorney-client
sexual violence is to prevent it from happening. The causes of sexual
violence are complex and multifaceted.245 Prevention may seem
daunting, but the promise of ending sexual violence before it begins is
invaluable. As such, it would be worth investing time and resources into
researching and developing prevention strategies. One such strategy
would be mandatory education on sexual violence against clients. That
could be accomplished through state continuing legal education
requirements as well as ABA requirements for law schools.
However, education alone will not be enough to solve this highstakes problem. The legal profession must consider more active
prevention strategies. Particularly with respect to child sex abuse, the
legal profession should look at prevention strategies emerging in other
industries. For example, in the sports context, the U.S. Center for Safe
Sport imposes the Minor Athlete Abuse Prevention Policies (MAAPP),
which include a number of affirmative rules that govern adult behavior
towards minors.246 The MAAPP include requirements that all text
messages between an adult and a minor athlete include at least one other
adult party and that all meetings between adults and minor athletes take
245

See Gillian R. Chadwick, Reorienting the Rules of Evidence, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2115,
2133–37 (2018) (discussing the complex etiologies of sexual assault).
246 U.S. CTR. FOR SAFE SPORT, MINOR ATHLETE ABUSE PREVENTION POLICIES (2019),
uscenterforsafesport.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Minor-Athlete-Abuse-PreventionPolicies.pdf.
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place in a setting that is observable and interruptible.247 These protocols
aim to prevent child sexual abuse by reducing opportunities for adults
to groom and abuse children. Reflecting on the Becker case discussed
above, a requirement that a second adult be present during interviews
would have interrupted the attorney’s opportunity to abuse his child
client.248
Given the social and legal challenges of the attorney-client
relationship, there are several potential obstacles to such protocols in the
practice of law.249 However, the stakes are high enough to justify
investing in the research and dialogue necessary to explore and
potentially implement such protocols as appropriate. The legal
profession’s profound failure to address attorney-client sexual violence
will not be remedied with status quo thinking. At a minimum, lawyers
must study potential prevention strategies with an open mind. Here, the
ABA has the opportunity to play a pivotal role by assembling the
expertise and resources to explore and recommend sexual abuse
prevention protocols for lawyers.
CONCLUSION
The legal profession’s failure to adequately sanction attorneys
who sexually harass and abuse their clients represents a significant
shortcoming that must be addressed. This Article proposes a number of
specific suggestions to begin to bring the legal profession in line with
its purported values around justice, equity, and fairness by improving
accountability for attorneys who sexually harass and abuse the clients
they have been entrusted to represent. Some of the suggestions are bold
because bold action is required to remedy this so far intractable problem.
The Article argues for universal adoption of the sexual conflict of
interest rule and imposition of strict liability and presumptive
disbarment for attorneys who have sexual contact with their clients. The
Article also proposes presumptive actual suspension for attorneys who
commit sexual harassment against clients and a victim-centered attorney
discipline process. These measures will drive more serious
consequences and take better care of client-victims in attorney-client
sexual misconduct cases, thus bringing the attorney discipline system
closer to achieving its stated purposes of protecting the public and
247

Id.
Becker, 180 A.D.3d 1322.
249 Skeptics might immediately negate this idea, citing attorney-client privilege, confidentiality,
and the need to build rapport. While those are legitimate issues, they are not insurmountable on
their face.
248

CHADWICK

2022]

TIME’S UP

119

maintaining the integrity of the profession. Finally, the Article proposes
the exploration of affirmative prevention mechanisms to help reduce the
opportunity for lawyers to sexually abuse and harass their clients,
particularly child clients. By enacting these reforms, the legal profession
can begin to live up to its role as advocates for justice on the issue of
sexual violence.

